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Strange  Attractors  in Evolutionary  Game Dynamics1 
Brian  Skyrms 
University of California-Irvine 
1.  Introduction 
The classical game theory of von Neumann and Morgenster  (1947) is built on the 
concept of equilibrium.  I will begin this essay with two more or less controversial 
philosophical claims regarding  that equilibrium concept: 
(1)The explanatory significance of the equilibrium concept depends on the under- 
lying dynamics. 
(2) When the underlying dynamics is taken seriously, it becomes apparent  that 
equilibrium  is not the central explanatory  concept. 
With regard  to the first thesis, let me emphasize a point first made by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern  themselves. Their theory is a static theory which discusses the na- 
ture and existence of equilibrium, but which does not address the question: "How is 
equilibrium  reached?" The explanatory significance of the equilibrium  concept, how- 
ever, depends on the plausibility of the underlying dynamics which is supposed to 
bring  players to equilibrium. One sort of story supposes that the decision makers in- 
volved reach equilibrium  by an idealized reasoning process which requires a great 
deal of common knowledge, godlike calculational powers, and perhaps  allegiance to 
the recommendations  of a particular  theory of strategic interaction.  Another kind of 
story-deriving  from evolutionary biology-views  game theoretic equilibria as fixed 
points of evolutionary adaptation,  with none of the rational idealization of the first 
story. The power of game theory to explain a state of affairs as an equilibrium  thus de- 
pends on the viability of a dynamical scenario appropriate  to the situation in question, 
which shows how such an equilibrium  would be reached. 
It is well-known that the problem is especially pressing in an area of game theory 
which von Neumann and Morgenstern  did not emphasize: the theory of non-zero sum, 
non-cooperative games. Here, unlike the zero-sum case, many non-equivalent equilib- 
ria are possible. If different decision makers aim for different equilibria,  then the joint 
result of their actions may not be an equilibrium at all. Thus the dynamics must bear 
the burden  of accounting for equilibrium  selection by the players, because without an 
account of equilibrium selection the equilibrium concept itself loses its plausibility. 
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Once one has asked the first dynamical question: "How is equilibrium  reached?"  it 
becomes impossible not to ask the more radical question: "Is equilibrium reached?" 
Perhaps it is not. If not, then it is important  to canvass the ways in which may not be 
reached and explore complex non-convergent behavior permitted  by the underlying 
dynamics. This essay will take a small step in that direction. 
In particular,  I will present numerical evidence for extremely complicated behav- 
ior in the evolutionary game dynamics introduced  by Taylor and Jonker (1978). This 
dynamics, which is based on the process of replication, is found at various levels of 
chemical and biological organization  (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988). For a taste of 
what is possible in this dynamics with only four strategies, see the "strange  attractor" 
in figure 1. This is a projection of a single orbit for a four strategy  evolutionary game 
onto the three simplex of the probabilities of the first three strategies. A strange at- 
tractor  cannot occur in the Taylor-Jonker  flow in three strategy evolutionary games 
because the dynamics takes place on a two dimensional simplex. Zeeman (1980) 
leaves it open as to whether strange  attractors  are possible in higher dimensions or 
not. This paper presents strong numerical evidence for the existence of strange attrac- 
tors in the lowest dimension in which they could possibly occur. 
Iterations  - 5008685  S3 
Si  S 
Figure  1: Parameter  = 5 
The plan of the paper  is as follows: Sections 2, 3, and 4 introduce  key concepts of 
games, dynamics, and evolutionary  game dynamics. Section 5 will describe the four- 
strategy  evolutionary game which gives rise to chaotic dynamics, and the bifurcations 
which lead to chaos as the parameters  of the model are varied. Section 6 will give a sta- 
bility analysis of the equilibria  encountered  along the road to chaos described  in section 
5. Section 7 describes the numerical  calculation  of Liapunov  exponents. Section 8 indi- 
cates some related literature,  and discusses the relation  to Lotka-Volterra  ecological 
models.  My second philosophical claim will be discussed in Section 9. 
2.  Games 
We will be concerned with finite, non-cooperative, normal form games. There are a 
finite number of players and each player has a finite number  of possible strategies. 376 
Each player has only one choice to make and makes it without being informed of the 
choices of any other players. The games are to be thought of as non-cooperative. 
There is no communication or precommitment  before the players make their choices. 
Each possible combination of strategies determines the payoffs for each of the players. 
A specification of the number of players, the number  of strategies  for each player 
and the payoff function determines the game. A Nash equilibrium  of the game is a 
strategy combination such that no player does better  on any unilateral  deviation. We 
extend players' possible acts to include randomized choices at specified probabilities 
over the originally available acts. The new randomized acts are called mixed strate- 
gies, and the original acts are called pure strategies. The payoffs for mixed strategies 
are defined as their expected values using the probabilities in the mixed acts to define 
the expectation (and assuming independence between different  players acts.) We will 
assume that mixed acts are always available. Then every finite non-cooperative nor- 
mal form game has a Nash equilibrium. 
The game in example 1 has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, one at <bottom, 
right> and one at <top, left>. Intuitively, the former equilibrium  is-in  some sense - 
highly instable, and the latter equilibrium  is the only sensible one. 
1,1  0,0 
0,0  0,0 
Example 1 
Selten (1975) introduced the notion of a perfect equilibrium  to capture this intu- 
ition. He considers perturbed games wherein each player rather  that simply choosing 
a strategy,  chooses to instruct a not perfectly reliable agent as to which strategy to 
choose. The agent has some small non-zero probabilities for mistakenly choosing 
each of the strategies alternative to the one he was instructed  to choose. Probabilities 
of mistakes of agents for different players are uncorrelated.  An equilibrium  in the 
original game, which is the limit of some sequence of equilibria  in perturbed  games as 
the probability  of mistakes goes to zero is called a (trembling-hand)  perfect equilibri- 
um. In any perturbed  game for example 1, there is only one equilibrium, with row and 
column instructing  their agents to play top and left and their agents doing so with 
probability  of one minus the small probability of a mistake. 
Classical game theory is intended as a theory of strategic  interaction  between ra- 
tional human  payoff-maximizers. It has sometimes been criticized as incorporating  an 
unrealistically  idealized model of human rationality.  Maynard-Smith  and Price (1973) 
found a way to apply game theory to model conflicts between animals of the same 
species. The rationale obviously cannot be that snakes or mule deer are hyperrational, 
but rather  that evolution is a process with a tendency in the direction of increased pay- 
off where payoff is reckoned in terms of evolutionary fitness. A rest point of such a 
process must be an optimal point. The insight that  just such a tendency may be 
enough to make rational choice theory and game theory relevant can be carried back 
to the human  realm, and accounts for much of the current  interest in dynamic models 
of learning and deliberation in game theoretic contexts. 
Maynard  Smith and Price are interested in providing an evolutionary explanation 
of "limited  war" type conflicts between members of the same species, without re- 377 
course to group selection. The key notion that they introduce is that of a strategy that 
would be a stable equilibrium under natural  selection, an evolutionarily stable strate- 
gy.  If all members of the population adopt that strategy,  then no mutant  can invade. 
Suppose that there is a large population, that contests are pairwise and that pairing is 
random.  Then the relevant payoff is the average change in evolutionary fitness of an 
individual, and it is determined  by its strategy and the strategy against which it is 
paired. These numbers  can be conveniently presented in afitness matrix and can be 
thought of as defining the evolutionary game. The fitness matrix is read as giving 
row's payoff when playing against column. 
R  H 
R  '  2  -3 
H  -1  -2 
Example 2 
Thus in example 2, the payoff to R when playing against R is 2 but when playing 
against H is -3. The payoff to H when playing against R is -1 and when playing 
against H is -2. Here R is an evolutionarily stable strategy because in a population 
where all members adopt that strategy, a mutant  who played H would do worse 
against members of the population that they would. Likewise, H is an evolutionarily 
stable strategy,  since H does better against H than R does. Suppose, however, that a 
mutant  could do exactly as well against an established strategy as that strategy against 
itself, but the mutant would do worse against itself than the established strategy.  Then 
the established strategy should still be counted as evolutionarily stable, as it has 
greater  average payoff than the mutant,  in a population consisting of players playing it 
together with a few playing the mutant strategy.  This is the formal definition adopted 
by Maynard-Smith.  Let U(xly) be the payoff to strategy x played against strategy y. 
Strategy x is evolutionarily stable just in case U(xlx) > U(ylx) or U(xlx) = U(ylx) and 
U(xly) > U(yly) for all y different from x. Equivalently, x is evolutionarily stable if: 
1: U(xlx) > U(ylx) 
2: If U(xlx)=U(ylx) then U(xly)>U(yly) 
The fitness matrix determines a symmetric payoff matrix for a two person game-the 
symmetry deriving from the fact that only the strategies matter,  not whether they are 
played by row or column-as  is shown in example 3. 
2,2  -3,-1 
-1,-3  -2,-2 
Example 3 
An evolutionarily stable strategy is-by  condition 1 above-a  symmetric Nash equi- 
librium of the two-person non-cooperative game. Condition 2 adds a kind of stability 
requirement. 
The formal definition of evolutionarily stable strategy applies to mixed strategies as 
well as pure ones, and some fitness matrices will have the consequence that the only 
evolutionarily stable strategy is a mixed one. This is illustrated in example 4. 378 
H  D 
H  -2  2 
D  0  1 
Example 4 
Neither H nor D is an evolutionarily  stable strategy,  but a mixed strategy,  M, of (1/3) H, 
(2/3) D is. This illustrates  condition  2 in the definition of evolutionarily  stable strategy. 
U(xIM)=2/3 if x is H or D or any mixture  of H and D. But an invader  who plays H or D 
or a different  mixture  of H and D will do worse against herself that  M does against her. 
For example, consider H as an invader.  U(HIH)=-2  while U(MIH)=-2/3.  The interpreta- 
tion of mixed strategies  as strategies  adopted  by each member  of the population is the 
only one which makes sense of the characterization:  if all members of the population 
adopt that strategy,  then no mutant  can invade. There is an alternative  interpretation  of 
mixed strategies  in terms of proportions  of a polymorphic  population,  all of whose 
members  play pure strategies.  The formal definition of evolutionarily  stable strategy in 
terms of 1 and 2 still makes sense on this reinterpretation  of mixed strategies. 
If we consider the two person non-cooperative normal  form game associated with 
a fitness matrix, an evolutionarily stable strategy,  x, induces a symmetric Nash equi- 
librium <x,x> of the game which has certain stability properties.  Earlier,  we consid- 
ered Selten's concept of perfect equilibrium,  which rules out certain instabilities. 
Evolutionary stability is a stronger  requirement  than perfection. If x is an evolutionar- 
ily stable strategy,  then <x,x> is a perfect symmetric Nash equilibrium of the associ- 
ated game, but the converse does not hold. In the game associated with the fitness ma- 
trix in example 5, <S2,S2> is a perfect equilibrium.2 
Sl  S2  S3 
S1  1  0  -9 
S2  0  0  -4 
S3  -9  -4  -4 
Example 5 
S2, however, is not an evolutionarily stable strategy because U(SlIS2)=U(S21S2) and 
U(S 1IS1)>U(S21S1). 
The concepts of equilibrium  and stability in game theory are quasi-dynamical no- 
tions. How do they relate to their full dynamical counterparts  when game theory is 
embedded in a dynamical theory of equilibration? 
3. Dynamics 
The state of a system is characterized  by a state vector, x, which specifies the val- 
ues of relevant variables. (In the case of prime interest here, the relevant variables will 
be the probabilities of strategies  in a game.) The dynamics of the system specifies how 
the state vector evolves in time. The path that a state vector describes in state space as 
it evolves according to the dynamics is called a trajectory,  or orbit. Time can either be 
modeled as discrete or as continuous.  For the former  case, a deterministic dynamics 
consists of a map which may be specified by a system of difference equations: 379 
x(t + 1) = f(x(t)) 
In the latter case, a deterministic dynamics is a flow which may be specified by a sys- 
tem of differential equations: 
dx/dt = f(x(t)) 
An equilibrium  point is a fixed point of the dynamics. In the case of discrete time, it 
is a point, x of the state space such that f(x) = x. For continuous time, it is a state, 
x = <xl, ...,xi...>  such that dxi/dt = 0, for all i. An equilibrium x is stable if points 
near to it remain near to it. More precisely, x is stable if for every neighborhood, V of 
x, there is a neighborhood, V', of x such that if the state y is in V' at time t=O,  it re- 
mains in V for all time t > 0. A equilibrium, x, is strongly stable (or asymptotically 
stable) if nearby points tend towards it. That is, to the definition of stability we add 
the clause that the limit as t goes to infinity of y(t) = x. 
An invariant set is a set, S, of points of the state space such that if the system starts 
at a point in S, then at any subsequent time the state of the system is still in S. A unit 
set is an invariant set just in case it's member is an equilibrium.  A closed invariant  set, 
S, is an attracting set if nearby points tend towards it; that is, if there is a neighbor- 
hood, V, of S such that the orbit of any point in V remains in V and converges to S. 
An attractor is an indecomposable attracting  set. [Sometimes other conditions are 
added to the definition.] 
A dynamical system displays sensitive dependence on initial conditions at a point if 
the distance between the orbits of that point and one infinitesimally  close to it increases 
exponentially with time. This sensitivity can be quantified  by the Lyapunov  exponent(s) 
of an orbit. For a one-dimensional map, x(t+l)  = f(x(t)), this is defined as follows3: 
1 
lim n-  log  adf  ,=  lim -  log2-  at xi 
n-oo  n i=0 
A positive Lyapunov exponent may be taken as the mark of a chaotic orbit. For ex- 
ample, consider the "tent"  map: 
Tent: 
x(t+  1)= 1-21-x(t) 
The derivative is defined and its absolute value is 2 at all points except x=l/2.  Thus, 
for almost all orbits the Lyapunov exponent is equal to one. 
An attractor  for which the orbit of almost every point is chaotic is a strange at- 
tractor. For most known "strange attractors"-like  the Lorenz attractor  and the 
Rossler attractor-there  is no mathematical  proof that they are strange attractors,  al- 
though the computer experiments strongly suggest that they are. The "strange  attrac- 
tor" in game dynamics which appears in figure 1 and which will be discussed in sec- 
tions 5-7  has the same status. 
4. Game Dynamics 
A number of different dynamical models of equilibration  processes have been 
studied in economics and biology. Perhaps the oldest is the dynamics considered by 380 
Cournot  (1897) in his studies of oligopoly. There is a series of production  quantity 
setting by the oligopolists, at each time period of which each oligopolist makes her 
optimal decision on the assumption that the others will do what they did in the last 
round. The dynamics of the system of oligopolists is thus defined by a best response 
map. A Nash equilibrium  is a fixed point of this map. It may be dynamically stable or 
unstable, depending on the parameters  of the Cournot model. 
A somewhat more conservative adaptive strategy has been suggested by evolution- 
ary game theory. Here we will suppose that there is a large population, all of whose 
members play pure strategies. The interpretation  of a mixed strategy  is now as a poly- 
morphism  of the population. Asexual reproduction  is assumed for simplicity. We as- 
sume that individuals are paired at random, that each individual engages in one con- 
test (per unit time), and that the payoff in terms of expected number  of offspring to an 
individual playing strategy Si against strategy Sj is Ui--given  in the ith row and jth 
column of the fitness matrix, U. The proportion  of the population playing strategy Sj  will be denoted by Pr(Sj). The expected payoff to strategy i is: 
U(S)  =pr(Sj)  Uij 
The average fitness of the population is: 
U(StatusQuo)  = Xpr(Si)  U(Si)  i 
The interpretation  of payoff in terms of Darwinian fitness then gives us a map for the 
dynamics of evolutionary games in discrete time: 
r'(Si  ) = pr  (Status  Qo) 
(where pr'  is the proportion  in the next time period.} 
The corresponding  flow is given by: 
pr'(S))  ) U(Si)-(Status  Quo)  _pr(S  ) 
dt  U(Status Quo) 
As long as we are concemed-as  we are here-only  with symmetric evolutionary 
games, the same orbits are given by a simpler differential equation: 
pr(Si)  = pr(S,)[U(Si) - U(StatusQuo)]  dt 
This equation was introduced  by Taylor and Jonker (1978) to provide a dynamical 
foundation  for the quasi-dynamical notion of evolutionarily stable strategy of 
Maynard  Smith and Price (1973). It has subsequently been studied by Zeeman (1980), 
Hofbauer  (1981), Bomze (1985), van Damme (1987), Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988), 
Samuelson (1988), Crawford (1989) and Nachbar (1990). It will be the dynamics con- 
sidered in our example in the next section. It worth noting that even though the 
Taylor-Jonker  dynamics is motivated by context where the payoffs are measured on 
an absolute scale of evolutionary fitness, nevertheless the orbits in phase space (al- 
though not the velocity along these orbits) is invariant  under a linear transformation 
of the payoffs. Thus the Taylor-Jonker  dynamics may be of some interest in contexts 
for which it was not intended, where the payoffs are given in von Neumann- 
Morgenstem utilities. 381 
Relying on the foregoing studies, I will briefly summarize some of the known rela- 
tions between quasi-dynamical equilibrium  concepts and dynamical equilibrium con- 
cepts for this dynamics. If [M,M] is a Nash equilibrium of the two-person non-coop- 
erative game associated with an evolutionary game, then M is a dynamic equilibrium 
of the Taylor-Jonker  flow. The converse is not true, since every pure strategy is an 
equilibrium of the flow. However, if an orbit starts at a completely mixed point and 
converges to a pure strategy then that strategy is a Nash equilibrium.  Furthermore,  if 
M is a stable dynamic equilibrium  in the Taylor-Jonker  flow, then [M,M] must be a 
Nash equilibrium of the associated game. However if M is dynamically stable, [M,M] 
need not be perfect, and if [M,M] is perfect, then M need not be dynamically stable. If 
M is dynamically strongly stable (asymptotically stable) then [M,M] must be perfect, 
but the converse does not hold. If M is an evolutionarily stable strategy in the sense of 
Maynard-Smith  and Price then it is perfect, but the converse does not hold. We do 
have equivalence between evolutionarily stable strategy and strongly dynamically sta- 
ble strategy in the special case of two strategy evolutionary games, but already in the 
case of three strategies there can be a strongly dynamically stable polymorphic popu- 
lation which is not a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy.  Thus, although their are im- 
portant  relations here between the quasi-dynamical and dynamical equilibrium con- 
cepts, they tend to draw the line at somewhat different places. 
As an example of a third  kind of dynamics, we mention the fictitious play of 
Brown (1951). Like the Courot  dynamics, there is a process in discrete time, at each 
stage of which each player plays a strategy which maximizes expected utility, accord- 
ing to her beliefs. But these beliefs are not quite so naive as those of the Cournot play- 
er. Rather than proceeding on the assumption that all other players will do just what 
they did last time, Brown's players form their probabilities of another  player's next 
act according to the proportion  of times that player has played that strategy in the 
past.4 Brown interpreted  his as fictitious play, and Courot  interpreted  his as real play, 
but either could just as well be interpreted  the other way. Thorlund-Peterson  (1990) 
studies a dynamics closely related to Brown's in the context of a Coumot oligopoly, 
where it is shown to have convergence properties superior  to those of the Cournot dy- 
namics. Brown's dynamics is driven by a simple inductive rule: Use the observed rel- 
ative frequency as your probability.  The basic scheme could be implemented using 
modified inductive rules. A class of simple Bayesian inductive rules which share the 
same asymptotic properties as Brown's rule are investigated in Skyrms (1991). For 
these models, if the dynamics converges it converges to a Nash equilibrium in un- 
dominated strategies. For two-person games, such an equilibrium  must be perfect. 
This contrasts with the Taylor-Jonker  dynamics where an orbit can converge to a dy- 
namically stable equilibrium, M, where [M,M] is an imperfect equilibrium of the cor- 
responding two-person non-cooperative game. 
5.  The Road to Chaos 
In this section we will focus on the Taylor-Jonker  flow. Flows are usually better 
behaved than the corresponding maps, but we will see that this dynamics is capable of 
quite complicated behavior. Taylor and Jonker already note the possibility of non-con- 
vergence because of oscillations in three strategy evolutionary games. They consider 
the game whose fitness matrix, U, is given in example 6 (where a is a parameter  to be 
varied): 382 
S1  S2  S3 
S1  2  1  5 
S2  5  a  0 
S3  1  4  3 
Example 6 
For a=l  the completely mixed equilibrium serves as an example of an equilibrium 
which is dynamically strongly stable but not an evolutionarily stable strategy.  For a<3 
the equilibrium  is strongly stable, but at a=3 a qualitative  change takes place. Now the 
mixed equilibrium  is stable but not strongly stable. It is surrounded  by closed orbits. 
At a>3 the mixed equilibrium is unstable and the trajectories  spiral outward  to the 
boundary  of the space. The change that takes place at a=3 is a degenerate Hopf bifur- 
cation.[See Guckenheimer and Holmes 1986, pp. 73 and 150 ff.]  It is degenerate be- 
cause the situation at a=3 is not structurally  stable. Any small perturbation  of the 
value of a destroys the closed orbits. This is just about as wild as the dynamical be- 
havior can get with three strategies. In particular,  generic Hopf bifurcations  are im- 
possible here. [ See Zeeman (1980) and Hofbauer (1981). Zeeman proves that a 
generic Hopf bifurcation is impossible for 3-strategy games, and describes the struc- 
turally stable flows for such games under the assumption that is discharged  in 
Hofbauer.]  And chaotic strange attractors  are not possible, because the flow takes 
place on a two-dimensional simplex. 
However, with four strategies we get the strange attractor  pictured  in figure 1. 
(This is a projection of of the three dimensional simplex of probabilities for four 
strategies onto the two dimensional simplex of the first three strategies.  The three di- 
mensional structure,  however, is fairly easy to see in the figure. ) There is a route to 
this strange attractor  that leads through a  generic Hopf bifurcation.  Consider the fit- 
ness matrix, U, of example 7 (where a is the parameter  to be varied): 
-1  -1  -10  1,000 
-1.5  -1  -1  1,000 
a  .5  0  -1,000 
0  0  0  0 
Example 7 
Figures 1 through 6 are snapshots taken along the path to chaos as this parameter 
is varied. At a=2.4 there is convergence to a mixed equilibrium  as shown in figure 2. 
The orbit spirals in towards the mixed equilibrium which is visible as the white dot in 
the center of the orbit. As the value of a is raised there is a generic Hopf bifurcation 
giving rise to a limit cycle around the mixed equilibrium.  This closed orbit is struc- 
turally stable; it persists for small variations in the parameter.  It is also an attracting 
set. This closed orbit is shown for a=2.55 in figure 3. As the value of the parameter  is 
raised further,  the limit cycle expands and then undergoes a period doubling bifurca- 
tion. Figure 4 shows the cycle of period 2 at a=3.885. This is followed by another  pe- 
riod doubling bifurcation, leading to a cycle of period 4 at a = 4.0, as shown in figure 
5. There are very long transients before the orbit settles down to this cycle.  At a=5, 
we get a transition  to chaotic dynamics on the strange attractor  shown in figure 1. 
Raising the parameter  to a=6 leads to further  geometrical complications in the strange 
attractor  as shown in figure 6. 383 
Iterations  = 1252455 
Si 
y  -?.  \ 
Figure  2.  Parameter  = 2.4 
Iterations  =1231893  S3 
Sl/  \2  S1  i 
Figure  3. Parameter  = 2.55 
Differential equations were numerically integrated in double precision using 
fourth-order  Runge-Kutta method [Press, et al (1989)].For figures 1 through 4 and 6 a 
fixed step size of .001 was used. For figure 5 a fixed step size of .01 was used.  This 
was done on an IBM model 70 personal computer with a 387 math coprocessor. The 
projection of the orbit on the simplex of probabilities of the first three strategies was 
plotted to the screen in vga graphics mode. For figures 1 through 4, the first 50,000 
steps (= 50 time units) were not plotted to eliminate transients.  For figure 5, the first 
100,000 (=1,000 time units) steps were omitted to eliminate very long transients. For 384 
Iterations  = 1105715 
Figure  4. Parameter  = 3.885 
Iterations  = 1061173  S 
Si 
S2 
Figure  5. Parameter  = 4 
figure 6, only the first 1,000 steps were omitted. In each case, the total number of 
steps run is shown in the top left corer  of the illustration.  The screen was captured 
using the WordPerfect  5.1 GRAB utility and printed on a Hewlett Packard  LaserJet II. 
6.  Stability Analysis of Equilibria 
As a suppliment and a check on the graphical  information  presented in the previ- 
ous section, the interior  equilibrium  points along the route to chaos were calculated in 
high precision (40 decimal places) using Mathematica.  The Jacobian matrix of partial 
derivatives was then evaluated at the equilibrium  point, and its eigenvalues found. 385 
These are used in stability analysis of the equilibria.[ See Hirsch and Smale (1974) 
Ch. 6.] One of these eigenvalues will always be zero; it is an artifact  of the constraint 
that probabilities add to one, and is irrelevant  to the stability analysis.5 
For example, at a = 2 there is an interior  equilibrium  at: 
xl  = 0.513639995434311151695011984933226800594 
x2 = 0.456568884830498801506677319940646044972 
x3 = 0.0285355553019061750941673324962903778108 
x4 = 0.00125556443328387170414336262983677662367 
and at this point the eigenvalues of the Jacobian found numerically to be: 
-0.857610802580407062636665715951399308, 
-0.0562990388422014452825117944612367686+ 
0.28751233664741609891927527291295404  I 
-0.0562990388422014452825117944612367686- 
0.28751233664741609891927527291295404  I 
-5.4204572416321964652348917801112836  * 10-42 
Iterations  = 6053606 
S1 
Figure  6. Parameter  = 6 
The last eigenvalue is the insignificant zero eigenvalue. The significant  eigenvalues all 
have negative real parts,  indicating  a strongly stable equilibrium,  which attracts  much in 
the way illustrated  in figure 2. Indeed at a = 2.4-the  situation  actually  illustrated  in fig- 
ure 2-the  situation  is qualitatively  much the same. The equilibrium  has moves to about: 
xl  = 0.363942 
x2  = 0.614658 
x3  = 0.020219 
x4 = 0.001181 
(henceforth  I suppress the full precision in reporting  the results). The non-significant 386 
zero eigenvalue of the Jacobian is numerically calculated at the order  of 10-39.  The 
significant eigenvalues are approximately: 
-0.9752593, 
-0.001670447 + 0.26020784  I 
-0.001670447 - 0.26020784  I 
However, when we move to the limit cycle illustrated in figure 3 at a = 2.55, the situa- 
tion changes drastically.  The equilibrium  is now at approximately: 
xl  = 0.328467 
x2 = 0.653285 
x3 = 0.018248 
x4 = 0.001164 
and the significant eigenvalues of the Jacobian are: 
-.993192, 
0.00572715 + 0.250703 I, 
0.00572715 - 0.250703 I 
The real eigenvalue is negative but the imaginary  eigenvalues have positive real parts. 
Thus the equilibrium  is a unstable saddle, with the imaginary  eigenvalues indicating  the 
outward  spiral  leading to the limit cycle.  A little trial and error  in this sort of computa- 
tion indicates that the Hopf bifurcation,  where the real parts of the imaginary  eigenval- 
ues pass from negative to positive, takes place between a = 2.41 and a = 2.42, where the 
real parts  of the imaginary  eigenvalues are respectively about  -0.001 and +0.001. 
In the chaotic situation where a=5 shown in figure 1, the equilibrium  has now 
moved to approximately: 
xl  = 0.12574 
x2 = 0.866212 
x3 = 0.006956 
x4 = 0.001070 
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian are: 
-1.0267, 
0.173705 + 0.166908 I 
0.173705 + 0.166908 I 
This still indicates a saddle point equilibrium  but here-as  shown in figure 1-the 
orbit  passes very close to this unstable equilibrium point. 
7. Numerical Calculation of Liapunov Exponents 
Liapunov exponents were calculated numerically using the algorithm  presented in 
Wolf et. al. (1985) Appendix A. This integrates the differential  equations of the dy- 
namical system to obtain a fiducial trajectory,  and simultaneously integrates four 
copies of the linearized differential equations of the system with coefficients deter- 
mined by the location on the fiducial trajectory,  to calculate the Liapunov spectrum. 
The latter are started  at points representing  a set of orthonormal  vectors in the tangent 
space, and are periodically reorthonormalized  during the process. In the calculation, 387 
logarithms are taken to the base 2. The code was implemented for the replicator dy- 
namics by Linda Palmer. Differential equations were integrated  in double precision 
using the IMSL Library  integrator  DIVPRK. The program  was tested running it at 
a=2, starting it on the attracting  equilibrium.  In this case, the spectrum of Liapunov 
exponents (when converted to natural  logarithms) should just consist of the real parts 
of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian  evaluated at the equilibrium, which were discussed 
in the last section. The experimental  results of a run from t=0 to t=l  0,000 were in 
agreement with the theoretical  results up to four or five decimal places: 
Experimental  Results  Theoretical Results 
-0.85761  -0.85761 
-0.0563  -0.0563 
-0.0563  -0.0563 
-3.4  * 10-6  0 
The three negative exponents indicate the attracting  nature  of the equilibrium point, 
and the zero exponent corresponds to the spurious eigenvalue as explained in the last 
section. 
For a limit cycle in three dimensions, the Liapunov spectrum should have the qual- 
itative character  <0, -, ->. The experimental  results on the limit cycles at a = 2.55, a = 
3.885 and a = 4  have the appropriate  qualitative character.  Dropping one spurious 
zero exponent, we are left with: 
a =2.55  a =3.885  a =4 
L1  0.000  0.000  0.000 
L2  -0.020  -0.008  -0.004 
L3  -1.395  -1.419  -1.423 
For a strange attractor  in three dimensions, the Liapunov exponents should have the 
qualitative character  <+, 0, ->. At a=5, where visually we see the onset of chaos in 
figure 1, the Liapunov spectrum  was calculated on a number of runs on a number of 
computers varying the reorthonormalization  frequency and various parameters of the 
differential equation integrator.  Dropping one spurious zero exponent, the following 
results are very robust: 
LI:  0.010 
L2:  0.000 
L3:  -1.44 
For a "gold standard  run"  the equations were integrated from t=0 to t= 1,000,000 
with an error  tolerance of 10-11.  On this run the zeros (both L2 and the spurious expo- 
nent) are zeros to six decimal places. Details of the convergence are shown graphical- 
ly in figures 7-10  (where one unit on the x axis represents 10,000 units of time). 
The positive value of the largest Liapunov exponent, L1, indicates that there has in- 
deed been a transition to chaos.6,7 388 
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8.  Relation to Lotka-Volterra  Models and to Other  Literature 
There are two papers discussing chaos in different  dynamics for equilibration  in 
games: one in an economic context and one in the context of theoretical  computer sci- 
ence. Rand (1978) considers Courot  duopoly models where the dynamics is 
Coumot's best response map. Where the reaction functions are tent shaped and have 
slope greater  than one, we get chaotic dynamics. This model differs from the one in the 
previous section in a number  of ways: (1) It is a map rather  than a flow that is consid- 
ered (2) it is a different dynamics (3) When the Coumot model is considered as a 
game, there are an infinite number  of pure strategies.  Huberman  and Hogg (1988) are 
concerned with distributed  processing on computer  networks. The problem of effi- 
cient use of resources in a network  is modeled as a finite game, and a quasi-evolution- 
ary account of the dynamics of adaptation  is proposed. In particular,  they argue for 
chaos in the limit of long delays for a delay differential  equation modeling information 
lag. The argument  is that the long term behavior is modeled by a difference equation 
which is in a class all of whose members display chaotic behavior.  The setting consid- 
ered by Huberman  and Hogg is conceptually closer to the one in this paper than that of 
Rand in that only finite games are considered, but the dynamics is different. 
There is a closer connection with ecological models which do not, on the face of 
them, have much to do with evolutionary game theory.  These are the Lotka-Volterra 
differential equations which are intended as simple models of population interactions 
between different species. For n species, they are: 
dxt  [ 
n 
1 
dt  = Xi  ri +  aijXj 
The xi are the population densities, the ri the intrinsic growth or decay rates for a 
species, and the aij the interaction  coefficients which give the effect of the jth species 
on the ith species. 
The dynamics of two species Lotka-Volterra  systems-either  predator  prey or two 
competing species-is  well understood,  and the dynamics of three and higher dimen- 
sional Lotka-Volterra  systems is a subject of current  research. Unstable cycles are pos- 
sible in two dimensional (predator-prey)  Lotka-Volterra  systems, but chaos is not. In 
three dimensions, however, several apparent  strange  attractors  have been found. The 
first was found by Vance (1978) and classified as spiral  chaos by Gilpin (1979). 
"Gilpin's strange  attractor"  has been extensively studied by Shaffer  (1985), Shaffer and 
Kot (1986), Vandermeer  (1991). Other  strange  attractors  have been reported  in three-di- 
mensional Lotka-Volterra  systems. Arneodo, et al (1980), (1982) use a mixture of nu- 
merical evidence and theoretical  argument  to support  the hypothesis of a Silnikov-type 
strange  attractors  in three and higher dimensions. See also Takeuchi  and Adachi (1984) 
and Gardini,  et al (1989). May and Leonard  (1975) show that other  kinds of wild be- 
havior are possible in Lotka-Volterra  systems of three competitors.  Smale (1976) shows 
that  for ecological systems modeled by a general  class of differential  equations (not 
necessarily Lotka-Volterra)  any kind of asymptotic  dynamical  behavior-including  the 
existence of strange  attractors-is  possible if there  are 5 or more competing species. 
There is an intimate connection between the Taylor-Jonker  game dynamics and 
the Lotka-Volterra  dynamics, which is established by Hofbauer (1981). A Lotka- 
Volterra  system with n species corresponds  to an evolutionary game with n+1 strate- 
gies such that the game dynamics on the evolutionary game is topologically orbital 391 
equivalent to the Lotka-Volterra  dynamics. To each species in the Lotka-Volterra  sys- 
tem, there is a ratio of probabilities of strategies in the game with the same dynamics. 
Thus it is possible to use known facts about one kind of dynamical system to establish 
facts about the other. Hofbauer uses the known fact the 2 species Lotka-Volterra  sys- 
tems do not admit limit cycles to verify Zeeman's conjecture  that 3 strategy evolu- 
tionary games do not admit stable limit cycles in the game dynamics. It is thus possi- 
ble to investigate game dynamical pathology with an eye towards ecological patholo- 
gy. The strange attractor  of the previous section is, in fact, the game theoretic counter- 
part to Gilpin's strange attractor.  For game dynamical counterpart  of the attractor  of 
Arneodo, Coullet and Tresser we have example 8: 
0  -.6  0  1 
1  0  0  -.5 
-1.05  -.2  0  1.75 
.5  -  .1  .1  0 
Example 8 
9  Conclusion 
Let us return  to the second philosophical thesis with which I began this essay. That 
is that When the underlying dynamics is taken seriously, it becomes apparent that 
equilibrium  is not the central explanatory concept. Rather,  I would take the central 
dynamical explanatory concept to be that of an attractor (or attracting  set). Not all dy- 
namical equilibria are attractors.  Some are unstable fixed points of the dynamics. In 
the dynamical system of example 7 with a=5 there is an unstable equilibrium  point 
which is never seen. And not all attractors  are equilibria. There are limit cycles, 
quasiperiodic attractors,  and strange attractors.  The latter  combine a kind of internal 
instability with macroscopic asymptotic stability. Thus, they can play the same kind 
of explanatory  role as that of an attracting  equilibrium-although  what is explained is 
a different kind of phenomonon. 
Even this latter point, however, must be taken with a grain of salt. That is because 
of the possibility of extremely long transients.  In example 7 with a=4, if we had omit- 
ted only the first 50 time units, we would not have eliminated the transient,  and the 
plot would have looked like the strange attractor  of figure 1 rather  than one of a limit 
cycle. If transients  are long enough, they may govern the phenomonae of interest to 
us. The concept of an attractor  lives at t = infinity, but we do not. 
Notes 
1The existence of this strange attractor  together with a preliminary  study of the 
route to chaos involved was first reported  in Skyrms (1992a). This paper contains fur- 
ther experimental results. I would like to thank the University of California at Irvine 
for support  in the form of computing time and Linda Palmer for implementing and 
running  programs to determine the Liapunov spectrum.  I would also like to thank 
Immanuel Bomze, Vincent Crawford,  William Harper  and Richard  Jeffrey for com- 
ments on an earlier version of this paper. 392 
2But it is not a proper  equilibrium. See van Damme (1987) for a definition of 
proper  equilibrium,  a proof that if S is an evolutionarily stable strategy,  then <S,S> is 
a perfect and proper  equilibrium  of the associated game, and a great deal of other in- 
formation  about relations between various stability concepts. 
3For flows the sum is replaced with an integral. For 3 dimensions, there is a spec- 
trum  of three Lyapunov  exponents, each quantifying divergence of the orbit in a dif- 
ferent direction. 
4To make the dynamics autonomous expand the concept of state of the system to 
include a "memory"  of frequencies of past plays. 
5See Bomze (1986) p. 48 or van Damme (1987) p. 222 and note that in the exam- 
ple given, the expected utility of the status quo (= the average population fitness) at a 
completely mixed equilibrium  point must be equal to zero, since for this fitness ma- 
trix, the expected utility of strategy 4 is identically zero. 
6For  purposes  of comparison,  the largest  Liapunov exponent here is roughly an 
order  of magnitude  smaller  than that of the Rossler attractor.  But the mean orbital  peri- 
od of the attractor  is roughly an order  of magnitude  larger.  If we measured  time in terms 
of mean orbital  periods,  L1 would here be of the same order  of magnitude  as L1 for the 
Rossler attractor.  Data on the Rossler attractor  was obtained  from Wolf et. al. (1985). 
7At a=6, although  the attractor  appears  to become geometrically more complex, 
the Liapunov spectrum  is little changed: 
LI:  0.009 
L2:  0.000 
L3:  -1.44 
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